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ABSTRACT Much debate in the early nineties centered on whether the federal 
entitlement program Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) reduced 
welfare dependency.  Many contend that AFDC discouraged work, increased welfare 
dependency, and undermined the institution of family.  Partly in response to these 
criticisms, welfare was reformed through the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996.  PRWORA modified the primary objectives 
of welfare by placing more emphasis on work experience accumulation and less on 
human capital accumulation.  Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) was 
designed to meet this primary objective.  Washington State’s TANF program, 
WorkFirst, utilizes a progressive system of programs (components) aimed at reducing 
welfare dependency through labor force participation.  WorkFirst components have a 
variety of objectives including skills training, temporary subsidized employment, and 
mentoring.  WorkFirst’s objective is to accumulate work experience of welfare 
recipients, thus making them more employable.  More work experience should place 
upward pressure on wage rates, which then in turn reduces welfare dependency.  We 
analyze the working decision as it is related to Washington State’s program design 
using a binary choice probit model.  We find that welfare recipients who are enrolled 
in the later stage components of WorkFirst are more likely to find work and exit 
welfare than those that have only completed the initial components designed under 
WorkFirst.  Cumulatively, WorkFirst seems to be an effective welfare program 
design.   
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INTRODUCTION
1
 
On July 1, 1997 the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program 
replaced the federal entitlement program, Aid for Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) in Washington State.  TANF provides temporary cash assistance and job 
training to low-income families with dependent children.  Each State is allowed to 
tailor their welfare program design to the specific needs of their clients.  In August 
1997, the State of Washington created WorkFirst as its welfare program designed 
under TANF.  The WorkFirst design discourages welfare dependency through the 
promotion of labor force participation and sanctions for non-compliance.  Programs 
(components) under WorkFirst provide individuals with mentors, educational 
opportunities, and paid work experience.  The underlying premise of WorkFirst is that 
work experience accumulation places upward pressure on wage rates.  Components 
within WorkFirst promote work experience and skill building, and through the 
completion of cumulative stages within WorkFirst welfare recipients become less 
welfare dependent, and in many instances self-sufficient. 
Washington State’s WorkFirst program is not an entitlement; it provides 
temporary cash assistance, job training, and work experience to welfare recipients.  
Recipients are allowed a maximum of 60 months of lifetime cash assistance, with at 
most 24 consecutive months of assistance.  Recipients must work or search for 
employment to receive cash assistance.
2
  Unsuccessful individuals not finding 
employment but making an effort according to WorkFirst guidelines can qualify for 
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2
 All individuals enrolled on TANF must be enrolled in at least one component; most recipients are 
enrolled in more than one. 
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extensions.  Because physically or mentally disabled individuals cannot participate in 
WorkFirst, they will continue to receive welfare assistance.
3
 
WorkFirst is a comprehensive and progressive welfare-to-work program that 
utilizes many components consisting of over 30 different employment induced 
welfare programs.  For the purposes of this paper, we will study the effects of only 
five of these WorkFirst components.  They include Job Success Coach Initiative 
(JSCI), WorkFirst Post-employment Labor Exchange (WPLEX), Job Components 
(JC), Pre-Employment Training (PET), and Community Jobs (CJ).  We chose these 
components because they are employment training, counseling and guidance 
programs.  All five components are different in their nature and each attracts a 
different clientele.  They are also progressive and attract the most political attention.
4
 
Clients with very poor job skills often enter the WorkFirst program by enrolling 
in CJ, PET or JC.  The CJ program is a community-based work and skill-building 
experience for heads of households receiving TANF benefits.  The CJ program 
provides participants with valuable work experience and skills training.  CJ benefits 
both the individual and local communities, often leading to a permanent job and job 
retention while meeting WorkFirst participation requirements “to work, look for work 
or prepare for work.”  Recipients that secure jobs under CJ are only temporarily 
employed, most typically for six months.  PET is a program designed to assist 
individuals with additional education.  The majority of PET individuals are enrolled 
in a Microsoft funded community college program focused on the acquisition of 
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funding. 
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computer skills.  The JC program is a series of classes offered by the state.  These 
classes teach participants how to act professional, look for work, and interview for 
jobs. 
The JSCI and WPLEX programs tend to attract stronger clients whom are 
typically in the final stages of the WorkFirst program.  The JSCI program assigns a 
job coach to each enrollee.  The job coach guides individuals in their job search 
journey by offering advice and counseling.  After clients have obtained employment 
they receive additional counseling from WPLEX call center associates.  After 
enrollees enter the work force, the WPLEX program can assist them in finding better 
jobs as their job-skills improve and work experience increases.   
WorkFirst is a progressive welfare-to-work design because clients typically start 
in JC, CJ or PET.  After completion of any of these preliminary components, clients 
enroll in JSCI or WPLEX.   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much experimental design was conducted in the early 1990's as an application of 
welfare reform.  Waiver programs allowed states to experiment with alternatives to 
the traditional AFDC design.
5
  Many of these waiver programs resemble TANF, 
focusing on strong work requirements through job search, therefore the waiver period 
can be thought of as a foundation for understanding how to model TANF correctly.  
The waiver period and the research associated with this period directly evaluate 
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 A majority of the Washington State sponsored welfare studies focus their attention on the 
performance of JSCI, WPLEX, JC, PET, and CJ components, which determines how TANF funds are 
allocated. 
5
 Waiver programs existed pre-1996.  TANF turned discretion over to each individual state, and the 
waiver period was granted to enable states to test different welfare policies so that when TANF 
eventually took over as the dominant welfare policy, they would be prepared with the type of program 
they wanted to undertake.  Extensive experimental analysis was administered during this period. 
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different program designs, unified by the imposition of strong work requirements.  
Friedlander and Hamilton (1996) examined an experimental welfare model that 
would eventually mimic TANF by testing whether imposing an obligation to work, 
and the implementation of these policies that lead to work, actually increase 
employment levels which in turn should reduce welfare dependency.  The 
experimental data and design used by Friedlander and Hamilton (1996) is known as 
the Saturation Work Initiative Model (SWIM).  From 1985 to 1987 the county of San 
Diego initiated the SWIM welfare design, which took a cohort of people currently 
enrolled in AFDC and placed them in work assignments and other types of 
employment-directed programs.  Results show 75 percent of those who participated in 
SWIM were employed compared to 68 percent for the control group, a difference 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  Friedlander and Hamilton (1996) 
successfully find that the SWIM model reduces welfare dependency more than the 
existing AFDC design.  However, the authors' do not conclude that the waiver 
program is a successful overall welfare design, it is only marginally better than 
AFDC. 
 Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001), Fein et al. (2001) and O’Neill and Hill (2001) 
all look at the effect that similar waiver programs have had on employment, program 
participation, and wages.  Each of these papers found waivers to have positive effects 
on employment and wages.  In contrast, O’Neill and Hill, Bloom and Michalopoulos, 
and Fein et al. are all similar in that they find a negative effect on AFDC 
participation.  They suggest that the effects on wages and employment are due to the 
enforcement of work requirements, not from marginal incentive changes.  Similar 
 6 
results are found by Bartik and Eberts (1999); Blank (2000); Figlio and Ziliak (1999); 
Wallace and Blank (1999); and Ziliak, Figlio, Davis, and Connelly (2000).  Each of 
these authors' fails to determine whether each program design works as it is intended. 
 One issue with studying waiver programs is that only short-term effects of 
program reform are considered.  Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins (1997) evaluate 
the long-term aspects of government programs for the disadvantaged.  Since welfare’s 
initial inception in 1935, they find no support for positive long-term effects on 
employment, wages, poverty, income inequality, and welfare participation.  Although 
most evaluations of the welfare population conclude that there are positive, 
significant effects of training programs in the short-run, they find that there is no 
evidence to support this claim over the longer-term.  One explanation is the skills 
learned by participants are not valued by employers over the long-term.  They should 
evaluate such a claim given the overall shape of the particular labor market for which 
their sample resides. 
 Supply controls typically include recipients’ marital status, age, race, education, 
recent work experience, and welfare history.  Surveys are the most common method 
for collecting labor supply data.  The most commonly used surveys include the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the Panel Study on Income 
Dynamics (PSID), the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and 
Longitudinal Database of Cases (LDB).
6
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 Hoynes (2000) incorporated panel data from a subset of the LBD survey to 
estimate the probability of exits, returns and duration with respect to labor supply and 
demand variables using a discrete time hazard model.  She found that labor market 
conditions significantly determined exits, returns and duration between 1987 and 
1992.  That is, welfare recipients are more likely to exit welfare and less likely to 
return when they are earning more.  Additionally, she found that the market wage was 
a strong determinate of welfare dependency.   
 Harris (1993) uses a panel of data, from the PSID survey, to evaluate single 
mothers enrolled on AFDC from 1984 to 1986.  She finds that the guarantee level is 
insignificant, and that a mother enrolled on AFDC exits approximately 67 percent of 
the time because of an employment opportunity.
7
  Harris (1996) follows up her own 
work by looking at a longer panel from the same survey to estimate the probability of 
single mothers re-entering AFDC once they have exited.  Once again, Harris finds the 
guarantee to be insignificant and, in general, claims that analyzing welfare is not 
always about the recipient weighing the costs and benefits of exiting and then 
returning.  More important factors are those such as age, number of children, 
education and marriage.  These factors significantly influence repeat dependency.  
The choice to exit and not return is mostly a function of the single mother’s need for 
dependency and the existing social context she lives in.  Women receiving welfare 
assistance are less likely to exit if they are single, have more dependents, older and 
less educated. 
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 The Guarantee level is the monthly transfer payment awarded to all recipients enrolled in WorkFirst.  
This amount is usually about $550 per month. 
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 In a preliminary study using data from the Washington State Population Survey, 
Learch, Mayfield, and Burley (1999) found that Washington State females who 
participated in WorkFirst job search programs had 12 to 27 percent higher 
employment rates, earned approximately $213 more per month, and had between 14 
and 20 percent less welfare enrollment than clients not participating.  They used client 
characteristics as labor supply controls.  Labor demand controls included local 
economic variables and local welfare office administrative practices.  Their results 
were admittedly preliminary and required verification.  We hope to verify these 
results using administrative records, and more importantly, we intend to analyze the 
WorkFirst design in the manner for which it is designed. 
 Supply side factors tend to be significant predictors of welfare dependency 
participation, and so they should be included in any empirical specification.  
However, generally speaking, demand side factors only generate statistically 
significant coefficients in studies using panels over long periods of time.  Because our 
time horizon is so short, we do not include demand side factors in this analysis that 
are aggregated at the state or local level. 
 The goals of the above studies are only partially relevant to our work.  However, 
our methodology is consistent with past methodologies.  Typical methodologies 
analyze the work-decision with a binary dependent variable (probit and logit models).  
The use of a dichotomous variable captures whether or not recipients are working.  
Any model using this feature has the ability to predict labor force participation on a 
vector of independent variables.  These types of models are also capable of evaluating 
welfare dependency, indicated by welfare exits and reentry. 
 9 
 Many current welfare designs have a progressive, cumulative nature to them.  By 
modeling progression one can partially determine how well a program is designed in 
terms of effectiveness in reducing welfare dependency.  To do this, one must be able 
to collect supply side data specific to individuals receiving welfare benefits and their 
component participation choices.  To categorize the sample in this manor, one must 
have access to administrative records.  Individuals entering WorkFirst progress 
through different components of the program until they are ready to exit and enter the 
work force.  Participants that do not complete the series of components should be 
more dependent on welfare and less likely to enter the labor force.  The literature has 
not yet captured this progressive analysis. 
DATA SET 
Most welfare studies use survey data.  We use Washington State Administrative 
records for our analysis.  We have merged wage data from Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) wage files with WorkFirst welfare data from the JOBS Automation System 
(JAS) of the Employment Security Department (ESD).
8
  The merged data produces a 
panel data set, consisting of both cross-sectional and time-series elements specific to 
individuals enrolled in WorkFirst.  Furthermore, this panel provides us the ability to 
capture both the working decision and welfare enrollment decision of each individual 
recipient over time.
9
  We end up with a cross-section of welfare recipients between 
2000 and 2001.   
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 The WorkFirst design can only be analyzed by using administrative records.  
Surveys offer information about the aggregate welfare population and are often 
inaccurate due to survey approaches.  By using individual welfare and wage data we 
can track individual decision making over time.  Specifically, we can track which 
WorkFirst components individuals have enrolled in, which component they started in, 
when they finished each component, and how they are doing in the labor force after 
exiting each component.  The merged data we have been able to collect allows us to 
evaluate what no other study has been able to, namely, measure the effectiveness of 
the WorkFirst design. 
 Table 1 provides various descriptive statistics of explanatory factors for the entire 
sample.  Of the five WorkFirst components, WPLEX generated the highest median 
earnings and employment rates while having the lowest percentage of reentry into 
WorkFirst; $2,742 per quarter, 92.1 percent, and 12.9 percent respectively.  JSCI has 
the highest exit percentage at 23 percent.  JC, PET, and CJ appear to be the least 
successful of the WorkFirst components.  For example, after completing CJ only 45.3 
percent were employed, only 12 percent exited, and median earnings were a meager 
$1,624 per quarter.  Demographically, the components appear very similar; marriage 
percentages, education levels, mean age of youngest child, and number of children 
residing in the welfare recipients household are similar across components.  However, 
work experience is very different across components.  Individuals enrolled in 
WPLEX and JSCI have more work experience than those in JC, PET, and CJ.  Even 
though the performance of these later programs appears to be disappointing, they are 
not.  Through self-selection, participants that enter JSCI and WPLEX are more 
 11 
prepared for work.  Individuals that are less prepared for the work force are 
encouraged to first enter JC, PET, and CJ.   
 We speculate that upon completion of these initial components, individuals are 
more likely to succeed in WorkFirst’s terminal components, WPLEX and JSCI.  It is 
evident from Table 1 that enrollees who successfully progress through WorkFirst 
components are better suited for the work force.  That is, the likelihood an enrollee 
finds a job and exits welfare is higher than that of an individual who bypasses one or 
more of the initial components of WorkFirst.  Those enrolled in the later stage 
components seem to be descriptively more successful than those enrolled in the initial 
stages of the WorkFirst design. 
 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
To model the Washington State welfare recipient welfare-to-work choice we utilize a 
discrete dependent variable similar to that of Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980).  We will 
let 
w
i
U  represent welfare recipient i ’s utility of remaining on welfare while 
e
i
U  will 
denote i ’s utility of exiting welfare given they are employed.  If 
i
X  is a set of 
individual characteristics unique to recipient i , then the corresponding linear random 
utility model has the form 
  
w
i w i w
U  β X     and     
e
i e i e
U  β X  (1) 
Utility for each choice is unobservable.  However, the choice made by recipient i  
reveals which choice provides greater utility.  If we define 
i
W  to be the observable 
choice that i  makes, then we can let 
i
W  equal one when 
e
i
U  exceeds 
w
i
U ; otherwise, 
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i
W  will be assigned the value zero.  If we let F represent the cumulative normal 
distribution function, 
e w
 β β β , and  
e w
    , then the probability that 
i
W  equals 
one is
10
 
   1 0i i i iP W F    X β X  
provided that the disturbances of system (1) are normally distributed.     
 The probit model will allow us to determine how effective WPLEX, JSCI, PET, 
CJ, and JC are at assisting WorkFirst participants in exiting welfare given the 
employment choice, as measured by our dependent variable which represents an 
individual who has exited welfare and is employed, W = 1.  To do this, we compare 
an unrestricted model with six restricted models.  Each regression model will include 
the following set of individual characteristics: work experience (past 6 years), work 
experience (past year), education level, number of children, age of client, age of 
youngest child, and wages.  
 We use component identifiers to flag those enrolled in each of the included 
components: WPLEX, JSCI, PET, CJ, and JC.  If a client is enrolled in the j
th
 
component, then the corresponding component identifier,
j
D , will be assigned a one, 
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 
 
 
 
1
0
0
0
e w
e e w w
e w e w
P W P U U
P
P
P
F
 
 


  
    
     
  
  
X
β X β X X
β X β X X
β X X
β X
 
where F is denotes the cumulative normal distribution function, 
e w
 β β β , and 
e w
    . 
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zero otherwise.  The unrestricted model’s independent variables will include the 
entire set of WorkFirst participation identifiers,  
 , , , ,U W P L E X JSC I P E T C J JCD D D D DD . 
For testing the direct effect of each component we specify five restricted models that 
remove a corresponding component identifier.  For instance, when measuring CJ's 
effect on being employed and exiting welfare the component identifier matrix 
becomes  
 , , ,C J W P L E X JSC I P E T JCD D D DD . 
The sixth restricted model includes no component identifiers.  The empirical model 
specification is 
   ; ,
m
W f t d t

 
  

 
β X δ D
, (2) 
where the subscript m on D identifies the specification of the model as either the 
unrestricted (U) or one of the restricted models: WPLEX, JSCI, PET, CJ, or JC. 
 A likelihood ratio test (LR) will be used to compare the unrestricted model with 
the six restricted models.
11
  The likelihood ratio test determines whether each 
j
  
coefficient corresponding to each component identifier is significantly different from 
the unrestricted model.  A significant chi-square value implies that the component in 
question is a significant predictor of employment and welfare exits, relative to all 
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 The likelihood ratio statistic is ˆ ˆ2 ln ln( )
R U
L R L L   , where ˆ
R
L  and  ˆln
U
L are the log-likelihood 
functions evaluated at the restricted and unrestricted estimates, respectively (Greene, 2000 pp. 826).  
For the unrestricted model, SAS reported ˆ2 ln
U
L  = 7668.53.  The unrestricted model included all of 
the explanatory and indicator variables.  The values of ˆ2 ln
R
L  for the restricted models ranged from 
7668.54 to 7729.59.  Table 3 summarizes the values of these statistics and their respective Log-
Likelihood ratios. 
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other components.  If the restricted model that excludes all dummy variables is 
significant, the five components are more likely to create employment and reduce 
welfare dependency than all other WorkFirst components not included in our study.  
This test will determine the total effect of WorkFirst on employment and welfare 
exits.  The results of the other five restricted models determine if an individual 
WorkFirst component is a significant predictor by itself, a direct test of the individual 
effect of each WorkFirst component. 
 We would also like to predict how welfare recipient quarterly earnings, Y, are 
impacted by their participation in WPLEX, JSCI, PET, CJ, and JC.  To do this, we 
will estimate the parameters of  
  
i i i i
Y     θX φD  (3) 
using ordinary least squares (OLS).  Equation (3) will determine which predictors 
have a significant relationship with earnings, and whether or not the relationship is 
positive or negative.  Each component identifier will determine how expected 
earnings are affected by the participation in each of the five WorkFirst components.  
The intercept coefficient includes all other individuals in the caseload but not enrolled 
in one of the five components.  We simultaneously control for demographics and 
prior work experience with the inclusion of 
i
X . 
RESULTS 
 The results of the nonlinear estimation of equation (2) are reported in Table 2 
below.  Odds ratios and their corresponding standard errors for each of the predictors 
in the unrestricted binary choice probit model are included in this table.  Results show 
that coefficients for identifiers corresponding to WPLEX, JSCI, and JC have the 
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highest odds ratios (each is greater than zero).  The WPLEX odds ratio is 1.364 
suggesting individuals enrolled in WPLEX are 1.364 times more likely to be 
employed and have exited welfare than those recipients not enrolled in WPLEX.  The 
JSCI odds ratio is even greater at 2.355.  Those who have successfully exited JSCI 
are 2.355 times more likely to be employed and off of welfare than those not 
completing JSCI during the same period.  The JC component also has significant 
positive effects on employment and welfare exits. 
 Pre-employment training and community jobs enrollment and completion is 
actually less likely to yield employment and a welfare exit (0.988 and 0.974).  
Education and work experience enhance the enrollee’s likelihood of finding work and 
exiting welfare; while the number of children, age of youngest child, and age of client 
appear to have very little effect.  The older the client or the more children the client 
has, decrease the chances of employment and exiting welfare.  Clients that have 
younger children are less likely to be employed and more likely to exit welfare.  This 
is a general conclusion not necessarily related to a particular component. 
 The likelihood ratio test statistics comparing the unrestricted probit model with 
our six restricted models are reported in Table 3 below.  The first row of Table 3 
corresponds to the restricted regression that excludes all component identifiers, while 
the other five rows correspond to the remaining five restricted regressions.  Notice 
that the test statistic associated with row 1 is 122.18.  This implies that the programs 
we chose to include in this study (WPLEX, JSCI, PET, CJ, and JC) significantly 
improve a WorkFirst client’s likelihood of being employed and exiting welfare.  Each 
restricted model tests whether or not any of the individual programs have significant 
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effects on employment and welfare exits relative to competing programs.  Our results 
suggest JSCI, WPLEX, and JC all significantly increase the likelihood of finding 
work and exiting welfare, while pre-employment training and community jobs do not.  
Thus, individuals enrolled in WorkFirst’s initial components are not as prepared to 
exit welfare as their counterparts in the terminal components, and so should remain in 
the program until the terminal components are completed. 
 The results of the empirical estimation of equation (3) are reported in Table 4 
below.  Equation (3) predicts a welfare recipient’s expected quarterly earnings, Y, 
given the individual’s characteristics and participation in WPLEX, JSCI, PET, CJ, or 
JC.  Work experience, JSCI, and WPLEX significantly increase earnings, on average.  
For instance, if a participant in WorkFirst is enrolled in WPLEX, her earnings will 
increase, on average, by $1,018.18 per quarter after completion.  Likewise, if an 
individual is enrolled in JSCI, her earnings will increase by an average of $491.69 per 
quarter.  The Community Jobs, Pre-Employment Training, and J-Components 
programs appear to have negative effects on quarterly earnings; these programs 
reduce earnings by $92.82, $105.14, and $48.97 respectively.  The intercept term 
represents all other programs in the WorkFirst caseload.  Therefore, all other 
components within the WorkFirst program increase earnings, on average, by $114.62.  
Age, work experience, and number of children are positively correlated with earnings, 
each is significant.  Age of youngest child has a negative correlation with earnings.  
Education is not a significant predictor of earnings, and therefore has no relationship 
with earnings.  The welfare population as a whole is uneducated; most do not have 
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college degrees, and a college degree is the only degree that could really differentiate 
earnings between these individuals. 
 Those who have completed later stage components have a higher probability of 
working and exiting welfare at higher wages (JSCI and WPLEX).  Those who 
complete initial stage components are less likely to find work, exit welfare, and earn 
lower wages than those completing later stage components (CJ, PET, and JC).  
WorkFirst, by design, encourages individuals to initially enroll in initial stage 
components such as CJ, PET, or JC.   After completing these initial components, the 
welfare recipient is then ready to look for work and enrolls in JSCI or WPLEX.  
Those welfare recipients who progress through the WorkFirst design face better odds 
of exiting the welfare rolls through employment and earn higher wages than those 
who do not.   
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our results show that WPLEX and JSCI are stronger predictors of employment, while 
completion reduces welfare dependency; both programs increase wages significantly.  
On the other hand, the pre-employment training and community jobs components are 
not strong predictors of employment and do not significantly reduce welfare 
dependency.  CJ and PET actually decrease earnings on average.  This can be 
explained in several ways.  First, people that are enrolled in WPLEX and JSCI tend to 
have more work experience, are younger, and have fewer children on average; 
demographics of this group are more favorable.  Secondly, these enrollees may have 
already been through at least one of the other WorkFirst programs, for instance, pre-
employment training or community jobs.  That is, individuals often learn job skills 
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and job training before being enrolled in WPLEX or JSCI.  The WorkFirst design is 
intended to build work experience and skills through completion of several 
components, or stages.   
 This analysis has showed several things, and has also left several questions 
unanswered.  WPLEX and JSCI are more effective, on average, than all other 
WorkFirst programs at increasing the likelihood of employment and exiting welfare.  
However, those enrolled in WPLEX or JSCI could be better prepared for the job 
market than those enrolled in CJ, PET, and JC.  Whether this is due to the design of 
WorkFirst or attributed to the demographics and personal characteristics of each 
individual is ambiguous.  However, overall, if the welfare recipient does progress 
through the various stages, components, they are more likely to be employed and exit 
welfare.  
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TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Component JSCI WPLEX JC PET CJ 
N 691 1122 8637 1588 1838 
N with UI-reported 
wages 
571 1033 4635 739 832 
% employed in the 
CY2001, Q1 
83.00% 92.10% 53.70% 46.50% 45.30% 
Median quarterly 
earnings in CY2001, 
Q1 
$1,657  $2,724  $1,496  $1,954  $1,624  
% who exit TANF in 
January 2001 
23.00% 17.90% 18.00% 14.70% 12.00% 
% returning in Feb., 
March, or April 2001 
15.10% 12.90% 17.10% 19.30% 18.20% 
Mean age of client 31* 33 33 32* 33* 
Mean age of youngest 
child 
6* 7* 8* 7* 8* 
Mean number of 
children 
2 2 2 2 2 
% that never made it 
through eighth grade 
10.48% 11.42% 12.34% 10.45% 12.01% 
% with some high 
school 
41.22% 24.28% 29.98% 34.54% 35.20% 
% with high school 
diploma/GED 
42.16% 49.31% 45.68% 44.37% 43.23% 
% with some college 5.50% 13.17% 10.36% 9.64% 8.70% 
% with at least a 
BS/BA 
0.62% 1.81% 1.64% 0.99% 0.85% 
Percent married 23% 32%* 28%* 24%* 22%* 
% of past 24 quarters 
employed 
43.79% 44.13% 34.90% 33.05% 35.83% 
% of past 4 quarters 
employed 
57.58% 62.10% 43.02% 37.48% 30.16% 
Median earnings over 
past 4 quarters 
1,018 1,680 878 895 681 
Percent with zero 
earnings in 6 years 
2.28% 4.18% 12.79% 11.83% 10.64% 
Data Source: JAS, UI wage file, monthly JSCI report, an * says that the cell in question is 
significantly different than the caseload.   
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Table 2 Odds Ratios of the Unrestricted Probit Model 
Odds Ratio Estimates Effects 
Point 
Estimate 
Standard Errors 
Education 1.000 0.000087 
Age Client 0.989 0.00265 
Age of Youngest Child 0.992 0.00355 
Work Experience (last 6 years) 1.025 0.00437 
Work Experience (previous year) 1.035 0.0183 
Number Children 0.966 0.0196 
Community Jobs (CJ) 0.974 0.0824 
JSCI 2.355 0.0818 
Pre-Employment Training (PET) 0.988 0.0814 
WPLEX 1.364 0.0774 
J-Components (JC) 1.431 0.0788 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Likelihood Ratio Test Statistics 
(Unrestricted 2 lo g -lik e lih o o d   = 7668.53) 
Restricted Model 2 lo g -lik e lih o o d   Likelihood Ratio
*
 
No Identifiers 7729.59 122.118 
JSCI 7717.41 97.75 
J-Components 7678.24 19.42 
WPLEX 7676.23 15.402 
Community Jobs 7668.58 0.099 
Pre-Employment Training 7668.54 0.022 
*
 The chi-square statistic is calculated by subtracting the unrestricted 2 lo g -lik e lih o o d   
from that of the restricted (Greene 2000, pp. 826).  
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Table 4 OLS Estimates of Equation 2 
Effect 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Errors 
Intercept 114.62 47.32 
Education -0.206 0.369 
Age of Client 7.588 1.467 
Age of Youngest Child -5.93 1.553 
Work Experience (last 6 years) 57.14 2.230 
Work Experience (previous year) 36.71 9.248 
Number of Children 63.09 9.124 
Community Jobs (CJ) -92.82 36.68 
JSCI 491.69 54.13 
Pre-Employment Training (PET) -105.14 37.54 
WPLEX 1018.18 45.46 
J-Components (JC) -48.97 38.82 
 
 
